DNV：全球能源转型展望2022—氢能预测至2050（英）.pdf

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1、HYDROGEN FORECAST TO 2050Energy Transition Outlook 20222DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 CONTENTS Foreword 3 Highlights 41 Introduction 8 1.1 Properties of hydrogen 9 1.2 Todays industrial use and ambitions 12 1.3 Hydrogen value chains 15 1.4 Safety, risks and hazards 20 1.5 Hydrogen investments risks

2、262 Hydrogen policies and strategies 30 2.1 Policy and the hydrogen transition 30 2.2 Details on the policy and regulatory landscape 34 2.3 Regional hydrogen policy developments 37 2.4 Policy factors in our hydrogen forecast 463 Producing hydrogen 48 3.1 Ways of producing hydrogen 48 3.2 Hydrogen fr

3、om fossil fuels: methane reforming and coal gasification 50 3.3 Hydrogen from electricity: electrolysis 524 Storage and transport 56 4.1 Ways of transporting and storing hydrogen 56 4.2 Storage 58 4.3 Transmission transport system 61 4.4 Distribution pipelines 65 4.5 Shipping hydrogen 665 Hydrogen:

4、forecast demand and supply 70 5.1 Hydrogen production 73 5.2 Hydrogen as feedstock 78 5.3 Hydrogen as energy 816 Trade infrastructure 92 6.1 Seaborne interregional transport 93 6.2 Pipeline transport 947 Deep dive: evolution of value chains 96 7.1 Four competing hydrogen value chains 96 7.2 Solar PV

5、 in Southern Spain 98 7.3 Geothermal energy in Iceland 101 7.4 Offshore wind on the North Sea 104 7.5 Nuclear power 106 7.5 Comparison and conclusion 108 References 110 Project team 113 3ForewordFOREWORDRemi EriksenGroup president and CEODNVWelcome to DNVs first standalone forecast of hydrogen in th

6、e energy transition through to 2050.While there are ambitious statements about the prominent role that hydrogen could play in the energy transition, the amount of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen currently being produced is negligible. That, of course, will change. But the key questions are, when a

7、nd by how much? We find that hydrogen is likely to satisfy just 5% of global energy demand by 2050 two thirds less than it should be in a net zero pathway. Clearly, much stronger policies are needed globally to push hydrogen to levels required to meet the Paris Agreement. Here it is instructive to l

8、ook at the enabling policies in Europe where hydrogen will likely be 11% of the energy mix by 2050.Five percent globally translates into more than 200 million tonnes of hydrogen as an energy carrier, which is still a significant number. One fifth of this amount is ammonia, a further fifth comprises

9、e-fuels like e-methanol and clean aviation fuel, with the remainder pure hydrogen.Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe, but only available to us locked up in compounds like fossil fuels, gasses and water. It takes a great deal of energy to liberate those hydrogen molecules either in

10、 blue form via steam methane reforming of natural gas with CCS, or as green hydrogen from water and renewable electricity via electrolysis. By 2050, more than 70% of hydrogen will be green. Owing to the energy losses involved in making green hydrogen, renewables should ideally first be used to chase

11、 coal and, to some extent, natural gas, out of the electricity mix. In practice, there will be some overlap, because hydrogen is an important form of storage for variable renewables. But it is inescapable that wind and solar PV are prerequisites for green hydrogen; the higher our ambitions, the grea

12、ter the build-out of those sources must be.Hydrogen is expensive and inefficient compared with direct electrification. In many ways, it should be thought of as the low-carbon energy source of last resort. However, it is desperately needed. Hydrogen is especially needed in those sectors which are dif

13、ficult or impossible to electrify, like aviation, shipping, and high-heat industrial processes. In certain countries, like the UK, hydrogen can to some extent be delivered to end users by existing gas distribution networks at lower costs than a wholesale switch to electricity. Because hydrogen is cr

14、ucial for decarbonization, safety must not become its Achilles heel. DNV is leading critical work in this regard: hydrogen facilities can be engineered to be as safe or better than widely-accepted natural gas facilities. That means safety measures must be designed into hydrogen production and distri

15、bution systems, which must be properly operated and maintained throughout their life cycles. The same approach must extend to the hydrogen carrier, ammonia, which will be heavily used to decarbonize shipping. There, toxicity is a key concern, and must be managed accordingly.It is no easy task to ana

16、lyse the technologies and policies that will kick-start and scale hydrogen and then model how hydrogen will compete with other energy carriers. As we explain in this report, there will be many hydrogen value chains, competing not just on cost, but on timing, geography, emission intensity, risk accep

17、tance criteria, purity, and adaptability to end-use. I commend the work my colleagues have done in bringing this important forecast to you, and, as always, look forward to your feedback. 4HIGHLIGHTSForecast Renewable and low-carbon hydrogen is crucial for meeting the Paris Agreement goals to decarbo

18、nize hard-to-abate sectors. To meet the targets, hydrogen would need to meet around 15% of world energy demand by mid-century. We forecast that global hydrogen uptake is very low and late relative to Paris Agreement requirements reaching 0.5% of global final energy mix in 2030 and 5% in 2050, althou

19、gh the share of hydrogen in the energy mix of some world regions will be double these percentages. Global spend on producing hydrogen for energy purposes from now until 2050 will be USD 6.8trn, with an additional USD 180bn spent on hydrogen pipelines and USD 530bn on building and operating ammonia t

20、erminals.DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 Highlights5 Grid-based electrolysis costs will decrease significantly towards 2050 averaging around 1.5 USD/kg by then, a level that in certain regions also will be matched by green hydrogen from dedicated renewable electrolysis, and by blue hydrogen. The globa

21、l average for blue hydrogen will fall from USD 2.5 in 2030 to USD 2.2/kg in 2050. In regions like the US with access to cheap gas, costs are already USD 2/kg. Globally, green hydrogen will reach cost parity with blue within the next decade. Green hydrogen will increasingly be the cheapest form of pr

22、oduction in most regions. By 2050, 72% of hydrogen and derivatives used as energy carriers will be electricity based, and 28% blue hydrogen from fossil fuels with CCS, down from 34% in 2030. Some regions with cheap natural gas will have a higher blue hydrogen share. Cost considerations will lead to

23、more than 50% of hydrogen pipelines globally being repurposed from natural gas pipelines, rising to as high as 80% in some regions, as the cost to repurpose pipelines is expected to be just 10-35% of new construction costs.6HIGHLIGHTSHIGHLIGHTS Hydrogen will be transported by pipelines up to medium

24、distances within and between countries, but almost never between continents. Ammonia is safer and more convenient to transport, e.g. by ship, and 59% of energy-related ammonia will be traded between regions by 2050. Direct use of hydrogen will be dominated by the manufacturing sector, where it repla

25、ces coal and gas in high-temperature processes. These industries, such as iron and steel, are also where the uptake starts first, in the late 2020s. Hydrogen derivatives like ammonia, methanol and e-kerosene will play a key role in decarbonizing the heavy transport sector (aviation, maritime, and pa

26、rts of trucking), but uptake only scales in the late 2030s. We do not foresee hydrogen uptake in passenger vehicles, and only limited uptake in power generation. Hydrogen for heating of buildings, typically blended with natural gas, has an early uptake in some regions, but will not scale globally.DN

27、V Hydrogen forecast to 2050 7HighlightsInsights Hydrogen requires large amounts of either precious renewable energy or extensive carbon capture and storage and should be prioritized for hard-to-abate sectors. Elsewhere, it is inefficient and expensive compared with the direct use of electricity. Una

28、bated fossil-based hydrogen used as an industrial feedstock (non-energy) in fertilizer and refineries can be replaced by green and blue hydrogen immediately an important existing source of demand before fuel switching scales across energy sectors. Safety (hydrogen) and toxicity (ammonia) are key ris

29、ks. Public perception risk and financial risk are also important to manage to ensure increased hydrogen uptake. The low and late uptake of hydrogen we foresee suggests that for hydrogen to play its optimal role in the race for net zero, much stronger policies are needed to scale beyond the present f

30、orecast, in the form of stronger mandates, demand-side measures giving confidence in offtake to producers, and higher carbon prices.8DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 Hydrogen has been used in large quantities for well over 100 years as a chemical feedstock, in fertilizer production, and in refineries.

31、However, the present use of hydrogen as an energy carrier is negligible. That is because the production of hydrogen itself must be decarbonized currently at high cost before it can play a prominent role in the drive to decarbonize the energy system. That formidable cost barrier is not deterring the

32、energy industrys interest in hydrogen, although the number of projects with investment decisions and in a construction phase is still at a modest level. Further up the innovation pipeline, there are many feasibility studies from both existing technology suppliers, and start-ups are devel-oping more

33、efficient and larger-scale concepts.Hydrogen normally has significant cost, complexity, efficiency, and often safety disadvantages compared with the direct use of electricity. However, for many energy sectors, the direct use of electricity is not viable, and hydrogen and its derivatives such as ammo

34、nia, methanol and e-kerosene are the prime low-carbon contenders sometimes competing with biofuel. There is an emerging consensus that low-carbon and renewable hydrogen will play an important role in a future decarbonized energy system. How prominent a role remains uncertain, but various estimates p

35、oint to hydrogen being anything from 10 to 20% of global energy use in a future low-carbon energy system. DNVs own Pathway to Net Zero has hydrogen at 13% of a net zero energy mix by 2050 and gaining share rapidly by then. Our present task, with this forecast, is not to state what share hydrogen sho

36、uld take in the 2050 energy mix, but what share it is likely to take. We find that hydrogen is not on track to fulfil its full net zero role by mid-century in fact far from it. Our forecast shows that hydrogen is likely to satisfy just 5% of energy demand by 2050. Scaling global hydrogen use is bese

37、t by a range of challenges: availability, costs, acceptability, safety, efficiency, and purity. While it is widely understood that urgent upscaling of global hydrogen use is needed to reach the Paris Agreement, the present pace of develop- ment is far too slow and nowhere near the acceleration we se

38、e in renewables, power grid, and battery storage installations. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of interest among a range of stakeholders and the media in the promise of hydrogen. Yet very few commentators are taking a careful, dispassionate look at the details behind hydrogens likely global gro

39、wth pathway.This report is a part of DNVs annual Energy Transition Outlook (ETO) suite of reports. The results presented here will be part of the 2022 version of the main ETO report to be released in October 2022. Our insights and conclusions in this hydrogen forecast are based on more detailed hydr

40、ogen modelling in DNVs ETO model, including new modules for hydrogen trade and transport and a much closer study of new production methods and hydrogen derivatives. Our aim with this forecast is not to state what share hydrogen should take in the 2050 energy mix, but what share it is likely to take.

41、 The report starts by explaining the properties and present use of hydrogen, as well as safety and invest-ment risks, and continues by describing present and likely future hydrogen policies and strategies. Chapters 3 and 4 go into the details of hydrogen technologies for production, storage and tran

42、sport. The results from DNVs modelling of hydrogen uptake are presented in Chapter 5, looking at hydrogen production and use in the different energy sectors. Chapter 6 covers the trade of hydrogen. The final chapter dives into examples and a comparison of different hydrogen supply chains.1 INTRODUCT

43、ION9Introduction 11.1 Properties of hydrogen Hydrogen is both familiar and different from anything else in the energy system. As with electricity, hydrogen is an energy carrier that can be produced via renewable energy, and like electric power, it can be used to charge batteries (comprised of fuel c

44、ells). Like a fossil fuel, hydrogen is explosive and produces heat when combusted; it can be extracted from hydrocarbons, held in tanks, moved through pipelines, and stored long term; it can be transformed between gaseous and liquid states and converted into derivatives. These properties make hydrog

45、en a fascinating prospect in the energy transition, but also create barriers to its adoption in terms of safety, infrastructure, production, use cases, and commercial viability.Abundant, but costly to produce as a low-carbon and renewable energy carrier Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the u

46、niverse, but on Earth it is found only as part of a compound, most commonly together with oxygen in the form of water but also in hydrocarbons. 1 Abundant, but costly to produce as a low-carbon energy carrier2 Combustible, but behaves differently to natural gas3 Light weight, but low energy density

47、is an issue4 Liquid hydrogen and derivatives overcome limitations, but conversion is inefficient5 Great potential, but also significant challengesFIGURE 1.1Hydrogen properties$10DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 For use as an energy carrier or zero-emission fuel, hydrogen must temporarily be released fr

48、om its bond with oxygen or extracted from hydrocarbons. Hydrogen is the simplest of all elements, but processes to produce it in its pure form are not so simple: they are energy intensive and involve large energy losses, have significant costs, and can produce their own carbon emissions. The main dr

49、iver of widescale hydrogen use is to decarbonize the energy system, and more specifically those parts of it that are hard-to-abate (i.e., cannot be directly electrified). This makes it essential to produce and transport low or zero emission hydrogen, with efficient use of water and byproducts such a

50、s waste heat and oxygen.Hydrogen is the simplest of all elements, but processes to produce it in its pure form are not so simple: they are energy intensive and involve large energy losses, have significant costs, and can produce their own carbon emissions.Combustible, but behaves differently to natu

51、ral gas Hydrogen is combustible and gaseous at normal atmospheric pressure and temperature, but it behaves differently to natural gas, requiring adaption or development of infrastructure, appliances, and safety standards. Relative to familiar alternatives such as natural gas or petrol vapours, hydro

52、gen ignites with very low energy and has a wide flammability range. The dispersion behaviour is different to other gases due to the small size of hydrogen atoms. Hydrogen is colourless, taste-less, and odourless, meaning that specific sensors or odorization are required to detect it, and additives a

53、re needed to produce the familiarity of a visible colour flame when burning hydrogen.Light weight, but low energy density is an issue Hydrogen is the lightest element and has high energy density compared to weight, offering some advantages for applications where weight can be an issue, such as in he

54、avy road transport. Overall, it is more relevant to consider hydrogens energy density compared with volume, which is very low compared to other fuels. This makes hydrogen more difficult to store and transport. Low energy density also reduces the feasibility of hydrogen at least in its gaseous form f

55、or use cases not connected directly or regularly to the grid, such as shipping and aviation. The solution is to condense hydrogen to a liquid which only partly solves the challenge or convert it to derivatives such as ammonia, methanol, or synthetic fuels.Liquid hydrogen and derivatives can overcome

56、 limitations, but conversion is inefficient and can be costly Compressed hydrogen is in general the most cost- effective way of transporting large volumes over long distances, but this requires pipelines and presents techni-cal challenges. Hydrogen may need to be operated at different pressures (or

57、velocity) than natural gas/biome-thane and could have an adverse effect on materials (e.g., in pipes and valves).To match some of the density and flexibility benefits of liquid fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, hydrogen can be condensed into a liquid, but the temperature point for hydrogen liquefa

58、ction is extremely low at -253C, requiring significant energy. Even in its liquid state hydrogen is not as energy dense as comparable fossil fuels. Liquid hydrogen also has different safety characteristics than compressed gaseous hydrogen for example, becoming a heavy gas when released that may accu

59、mulate, rather than rising and dissipating as with compressed hydrogen gas.Hydrogen can be converted to derivatives such as ammonia, which has a higher energy density per volume than liquid hydrogen and can be stored and transported as a liquid at low pressures or in cryogenic tanks at around -33C a

60、t 1 bar. Ammonia can be transported at low cost by pipelines, ships, trucks, and other bulk modes. The caveat is that the ammonia synthesis, and its subsequent dehydrogenation to release hydrogen, requires significant energy. 11Introduction 1Great potential, but also significant challenges The prope

61、rties of hydrogen give it great potential in the energy transition, and there are solutions to the challenges presented by hydrogen properties. The trade-off is often the energy required to implement these solutions. The separation or extraction process for hydrogen production requires energy, and t

62、he energy content of the output hydrogen is always less than the energy content of the input fuel, plus the energy required for the hydrogen process. In other words, producing and converting hydrogen is inefficient and involves large losses. Hydrogen is also generally more energy intensive to store

63、and transport than other conventional fuels. The value of hydrogen in pure form to users or to society at large must be sufficient to justify the energy losses in its production, distribution, and use. The properties of hydrogen require consideration across the hydrogen value chain based on applicat

64、ion and context, to determine the best source, state, and derivative, and associated infrastructure and appliance, to maximize the benefits of hydrogen properties and minimize negative impacts. A successful hydrogen value chain will balance the pros and cons, physical and safety/risks, costs and ben

65、efits, and decarbonization potential of hydrogen against other energy carriers and fuels. One major consideration is the relationship between greater electrification and widescale hydrogen use. Where decarbonization through direct electrification of a sector is feasible, this is the first priority d

66、ue to the inefficiencies of converting electricity to hydrogen. Where electrification is not an option or a very poor one then hydrogen is the best alternative, as is the case in many so-called hard-to-abate sectors. The energy industry is clear on where hydrogen and electri-fication can play a role

67、: some 80% of energy professionals we surveyed believe that hydrogen and electrification will work in synergy, helping both to scale up; just 16% believe hydrogen and electrification will be in competition for the same share of the energy mix1.12DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 1.2 Todays industrial us

68、e and ambitions Hydrogen and its derivatives are produced in large quantities today, but as an energy carrier, its use is negligible. To meet the targets of the Paris Agreement, however, the existing industrial production of hydrogen must be decarbonized. More crucially, an additional very large qua

69、ntity of low-carbon hydrogen and its derivatives is needed as an energy carrier including heating in industry, shipping and aviation, and energy storage.Hydrogen production is already a thriving industry Hydrogen production is already a large and thriving industry. Except it is not low-carbon hydrog

70、en production that is thriving today. The hydrogen produced today is predominately used in fertilizer or for chemical feedstock and is produced from coal or natural gas without carbon capture. The associated emissions are significant: around 900 million tonnes of CO2 in 2020, or greater than the CO2

71、 emissions of France and Germany combined. Global demand for hydrogen and its derivatives as an industrial feedstock (i.e., non-energy hydrogen) is around 90 million tonnes per year (2020)2. In energy terms, this is equivalent to around 12 EJ or roughly 2% of world energy demand. To put this in pers

72、pective, DNV forecasts that demand for hydrogen as an energy carrier will not reach this level until the early 2040s. Non-energy hydrogen has a role to play in the energy transition, however. Tackling its emissions will help to scale and accelerate carbon capture and abatement technologies. Hydrogen

73、 today is used in oil refining, fertilizer, and industrial processes Todays hydrogen demand is split between pure 13Introduction 1hydrogen use in oil refining and demand for hydrogen from chemical production to produce derivatives such as ammonia and methanol. Of hydrogen used in chemical production

74、, roughly three-quarters is used for ammonia production and one-quarter for methanol. A relatively small proportion of hydrogen demand is also consumed directly in steel production. Petroleum refining Oil refineries are the largest consumer of hydrogen (around 37 Mt in 2020) using it to reduce the s

75、ulfur content of diesel oil and upgrade heavy residual oils into higher-value oil products. This demand is set to continue in the coming years as global oil demand remains around its current level, before declining from around 2030 with a fall in oil demand. Ammonia Around 33 Mt/yr of hydrogen is us

76、ed annually to produce ammonia (NH3), with 70% of this used as an essential precursor in producing fertilizers3. Accordingly, ammonia demand is correlated with global agricultural production, which continues to grow. Ammonia is traded around the world, with global exports equating to about 10% of to

77、tal produc-tion showing the feasibility of ammonia shipping and global ammonia trade, which will be an important enabler of the future hydrogen ecosystem. Methanol Around 13 Mt/yr of hydrogen is used each year for methanol production, which is used in industrial processes to produce the chemical for

78、mal-dehyde and in plastics and coatings. Steel Close to 5 Mt/yr of hydrogen annually is used directly in steel production for direct reduction of iron (DRI). Fossil fuels are currently used throughout the steelmaking process, in the form of coke, as a reducing agent, and as for various heat-intensiv

79、e stages of the iron- and steelmaking process all of which could be replaced by low-carbon hydrogen.The hydrogen produced today is almost exclusively produced from fossil fuels (grey, black and brown hydro-gen, from natural gas and coal respectively). However, carbon prices are rising, particularly

80、in Europe, and all industries are under mounting pressure to decarbonize particularly the oil and gas industry. From one perspec-tive, the transition from grey/black/brown hydrogen to blue and green (produced from fossil fuels with carbon capture, or by renewable energy) in oil refining, ammonia pro

81、duction, and other industrial uses could ensure early demand for low-carbon hydrogen, helping the hydrogen ecosystem i.e., value chains supporting hydrogen as an energy carrier to scale. From another perspective, these are large industries that will later compete with energy users for low-carbon hyd

82、rogen.Growing ambitions for hydrogen as an energy carrier Hydrogen has a new status as an important, viable, and rapidly-developing pillar of the energy transition. More than six in ten senior energy professionals surveyed by DNV in 2022 say that hydrogen will be a significant part of the energy mix

83、 by 20304, and close to half say their organization is actively entering the hydrogen market. More than this, the hydrogen pledges, plans, and pilots of recent years are now beginning to evolve into concrete commitments, investments and full-scale projects.To pursue their ambitions to increase their

84、 production of green and blue hydrogen in the coming years, producers will need greater certainty to have the confidence for large-scale investments and projects. This will require ambitious policies and government strategies, several industries simultaneously building the demand-side of the hydroge

85、n value chain, and realization of the expected huge growth in renewable generation. That growth has to accelerate beyond the demand for renewably-generated electricity to create clean, low-cost energy for green hydrogen production, and greater demand for hydrogen for energy storage.In line with clim

86、ate and net zero goals, many industries have a pressing need to replace carbon-intensive processes by reconfiguring their plants, machines, models, and practices to switch to hydrogen which can be a substitute for either fossil-fuel-based energy or feedstock needs in these industries. For example, l

87、ong-haul trucking fleets can replace diesel with hydrogen fuel cells; heat processes in cement, aluminium and steelmaking can be fuelled by hydrogen; and chemical companies that produce ammonia can swap grey/brown hydrogen feedstock for blue/green equivalents.We present the forecast demand and suppl

88、y in Chapter 5.14Low-carbon derivatives key to a widespread use of hydrogen as an energy carrier Just as hydrogen today is converted to ammonia and methanol for some industrial applications, widespread use of hydrogen as an energy carrier will also rely on hydrogen derivatives and hydrogen-based syn

89、thetic fuels, where the properties of these energy carriers make more sense for the application than pure hydrogen. These derivatives will need to be produced in a low- carbon way.Aviation and shipping stand out as the two sectors that will make the most significant use of low-carbon hydrogen deriva

90、tives. What they have in common is that they are disconnected from the grid and require large amounts of energy, meaning electrification or pure hydrogen are not feasible alternatives to the fossil-based fuels they currently rely on. The energy density of both pure hydrogen and batteries are too low

91、 to be used widely in these industries. Where these sectors differ from one another is the weight and space available for fuel storage, with weight particularly critical in aviation. Aviation Hydrogen-based synthetic fuels synthetic kerosene or similar are likely to be used in aviation, and we expec

92、t pure hydrogen to see some use for medium-haul flights, but we dont forecast significant uptake before the 2040s. Shipping There is no relevant battery electric option for decarbonizing the deep-sea shipping sector, with synthetic fuels, ammonia, hydrogen and biofuels being the most realistic low-c

93、arbon alternatives. These high-cost fuels, which can be implemented in hybrid configurations with diesel- and gas-fuelled propulsion, will see significant uptake, providing slightly over 42% of the maritime fuel mix by 2050, according to DNVs latest forecast. Hydrogen derivatives will also be used i

94、n the transport and storage of hydrogen, as we explore further in Chapter 5.FIGURE 1.3Energy industry ambitions for hydrogen Source: DNV Energy Industry Insights 2022, based on a survey concluding in January 2022. Overall Oil and gas Power Energy-consuming industries Renewables62%56%68%66%59%47%35%6

95、1%40%46%Hydrogen will be a significant part of the energy mix by 2030My organization is actively entering the hydrogen marketDNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 151.3 Hydrogen value chainsThe market and value chains for hydrogen as an energy carrier are in their infancy even as the potential has been deba

96、ted for decades. Hydrogen markets today are mainly captive, with production taking place at or close to key industrial consumers. There are little to no open commodity markets for hydrogen, with the exception of markets for hydrogen derivatives such as ammonia and methanol. Hydrogen is currently alm

97、ost exclusively produced from natural gas and coal without CCS. In many if not most cases, an intermediate step to a fully decarbonized hydrogen value chain is through the production of blue hydrogen (i.e. CCS-based hydrogen production from fossil fuels) before surplus or dedicated renewable energy

98、is available in sufficient quantities for the large-scale production of green hydrogen. For hydrogen to play a meaningful role as a strategic decarbonized energy carrier, new value chains and the development of hydrogen markets are required.Many different hydrogen value chains will develop towards 2

99、050. This is partly due to the versatility of hydrogen: it can be produced from coal, natural gas, grid electricity, or dedicated renewables; it can be stored, transported, and used in its pure form, blended with natural gas, or converted to derivatives; and it will be consumed across a range of ind

100、ustries and applica-tions, including maritime shipping, heat production, road transport, and aviation. Introduction 1DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 16SourcingSolarDedicated REproductionElectricity generationCoal andbiomassNatural gasWindHydroNuclearConversion to ammoniaConversion to methanol / e-fuel

101、sDirect use ofhydrogenElectrolysisw/ CCS= size of CO2 footprint, including lifecycle emissions.w/ CCSWaterGasificationMethane reforming40%ConversionFossil HYDROGEN PRODUCTION AND USE IN 2050 DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 17Introduction 1AmmoniashippingNH3NH3HydrogenshippingHydrogenpipelinesTruck wit

102、hgas tanksPipelinesAviationIndustryMaritimeRefineryTrucksBuildings HeatingIndustrialheatingFertilizerPowerGas gridInter-regionalregional20%40%TransportUseThis figure presents hydrogen production and use flows in 2050. The thickness of the flow lines approximates the volume of each flow indicating ma

103、jor production routes and end uses in 2050. However, in contrast to the Sankey diagram shown on page 68, no losses are displayed here. By 2050, the vast majority of hydrogen produced is low-carbon hydrogen either from renewable sources or CCS based fossil production. DNV Hydrogen Report 2022Introduc

104、tion 1FIGURE 1.4Comparison of selected hydrogen value chains and their competitorsPrimary energy sourceEnergy carrierEnergy serviceFinal energycontentSpace heatingPassenger road vehiclesShipsUseful heatRenewable electricityElectrolysisBoilerHydrogen57%33% losses 4% Transportation losses6% LossesUsef

105、ul heatNatural gasBoiler85%9% Losses6% Transportation lossesDedicated renewable electricityUseful heatPower generation (2020 world avg mix)Heat pump (2020 avg efficiency)Grid electricity135%51% losses3% Transportation lossesRenewable electricityFossil, nuclear, biomassAmbient heatUseful heatPower ge

106、neration (2050 world avg mix)Heat pump (2050 avg efficiency)Grid electricity307%22% losses4% Transportation lossesRenewable electricityFossil, nuclear, biomassAmbient heat12% Refining & transportation losses 72% LossesOilInternal combustion engineUsable energy16%Methane reforming with CCSHydrogen24%

107、 losses 4% Transportation losses6% Processing & transportation losses 38% LossesNatural gasFuel cell engineUsable energy27%Dedicated renewable electricityPower generation (2020 world avg mix)Grid electricity51% losses3% Transportation losses11% LossesRenewable electricityFossil, nuclear, biomassElec

108、tric engineUsable energy35%12% Refining & transportation losses 49% LossesOilInternal combustion engineUsable energy39%Renewable electricityElectrolysis & ammonia synthesisAmmonia48% losses3% Transportation losses27% LossesInternal combustion engineUsable energy22%Renewable electricityElectrolysis &

109、 methanol synthesisE-fuels51% losses3% Transportation losses26% LossesInternal combustion engineUsable energy20%Power generation (2050 world avg mix)Grid electricity22% losses4% Transportation losses11% LossesRenewable electricityFossil, nuclear, biomassElectric engineUsable energy63%DNV Hydrogen fo

110、recast to 2050 1819Introduction 1Efficiencies, economics, emissions, and geography key to determining viable value chains Determining viable hydrogen value chains is not just about linking production to consumption. It is considering energy efficiencies and losses, economics, greenhouse gas emission

111、s, and geography in terms of both location for transport, and resources such as natural gas and renewable energy for production. Issues of public acceptance and safety addressed in Section 1.4 are also pivotal. Figure 1.4 shows alternative hydrogen value chains and their associated energy losses. En

112、ergy loss is important when it comes to deciding a value chain, as it also determines the economic situation. However, the overall economic situation is usually the main determinant for the setup and design of a hydrogen value chain. The production of hydrogen is associated with significant losses i

113、n each value chain, but when the source of hydro-gen production, like renewable electricity in the coming decades, is abundantly available, energy losses will be less important in the long term. Value chain greenhouse gas emissions will be a decisive factor in establishing specific hydrogen value ch

114、ains. Takers of hydrogen, such as countries or end-use sectors, will have preferences on the value chain greenhouse gas emissions and thus incentivize their implementation. Transport of hydrogen is another decisive factor influencing a hydrogen value chain. Some world regions might not be able to su

115、pply their regional needs of hydrogen and thus have to import hydrogen via pipelines or maritime shipping. Related to this is the factor of geographies. Whereas some regions in the world can use abundant resources from wind and solar to produce green hydrogen, other regions might need to rely on hyd

116、rogen from natural gas. All of the above is of course surrounded by economic assessments as hydrogen is expensive to produce and needs to be used sensibly. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, there are plenty hydrogen value-chain permutations, impacted by, amongst others, the aforementioned factors. The s

117、pecific details combining in each of these chains, such as sources, conversion, transport, end use, etc. are presented in more detail in the coming chapters. Skills and standards key to successful implementation of new value chains The implementation of hydrogen in the energy system will re-use exis

118、ting energy industry skills and services across the whole supply chain. These will be transferred from the oil and gas sector to support both blue and green hydrogen. Connected to blue hydrogen, oil and gas skills will have to be retained to produce natural gas for refineries to reform into blue hyd

119、rogen. Standards and procedures for existing offshore opera-tions will help ensure the safety and success of the new hydrogen industry. For example, connected to green hydrogen, offshore wind will involve the installation of ever larger wind turbines requiring knowledge of floating and fixed structu

120、res in deep water and operation in challenging weather conditions. The hydrogen supply chain will also include ports and logistics, pipeline design and manufacture, transmission and distribution infrastructure, safety assessments, above ground storage tanks and below ground geological hydrogen stora

121、ge. Each of these will require skilled labour. Chapter 7 dives more deeply into value-chain evolution, with examples and details of their economics and possible growth paths.Value chain greenhouse gas emissions will be a decisive factor in establishing specific hydrogen value chains. ERR 能研微讯 微信公众号：

122、Energy-report 欢迎申请加入 ERR 能研微讯开发的能源研究微信群，请提供单位姓名（或学校姓名） ，申请添加智库掌门人（下面二维码）微信，智库掌门人会进行进群审核，已在能源研究群的人员请勿申请；群组禁止不通过智库掌门人拉人进群。 ERR 能研微讯聚焦世界能源行业热点资讯，发布最新能源研究报告，提供能源行业咨询。 本订阅号原创内容包含能源行业最新动态、趋势、深度调查、科技发现等内容， 同时为读者带来国内外高端能源报告主要内容的提炼、摘要、翻译、编辑和综述，内容版权遵循 Creative Commons 协议。 知识星球知识星球 提供能源行业最新资讯、政策、前沿分析、报告（日均更新 1

123、5 条+，十年 plus 能源行业分析师主理） 提供能源投资研究报告（日均更新 812 篇，覆盖数十家券商研究所） 二维码矩阵二维码矩阵 资报告号：ERR 能研微讯 订阅号二维码（左）丨行业咨询、情报、专家合作：ERR 能研君（右) 视频、图表号、研究成果：能研智库 订阅号二维码（左）丨 ERR 能研微讯头条号、西瓜视频（右) 能研智库视频号（左）丨能研智库抖音号（右) 20DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 1.4 Safety, risks and hazards Hydrogen is not new to society; it has been produce

124、d and used in large quantities for over a century. However, this has mostly been in industrial environments where there is a good degree of control, and where facilities are managed by people who have a clear understanding of the potential hazards. The forecast significant growth in the market for h

125、ydrogen as an energy carrier will introduce many new hydrogen facilities that are very different from those we have had in the past. Moreover, some of the facilities will be in much closer proximity to the public and will be built and operated by new entrants who may not have relevant experience in

126、hydrogen safety. Our previous experience of hydrogen safety is thus an imperfect guide, at best, as to what might happen in the future. Detonation of hydrogen is entirely credible at scales representative of many scenarios where it is not for traditional hydrocarbons. This image shows a still image

127、from a 15 m3 hydrogen detonation conducted as a demonstration at DNVs Spadeadam Research Centre in the UK21Introduction 1Risk perception will be an important factor in acceptance of hydrogen use. Accidents involving hydrogen are likely to receive more media attention than comparable events with conv

128、entional fuels (at least initially) and this could excite public resistance and prompt a more restrictive regulatory environment. The sensitivities to risk and risk perception will likely vary among sectors but will be highest where the public is near the actual use of hydrogen, such as in aviation

129、and domestic heating, and less so in more industrial-type applications such as hydrogen storage.Safety represents a significant business risk to investors and developers. There have already been examples where incidents at hydrogen refuelling stations have halted hydrogen use in vehicles for signifi

130、cant periods. The industry has tried-and-tested methods for managing the safety of flammable gases that have been used for decades and these come with some very important, hard won, lessons. Firstly, safety must be based on an understanding of how the particular properties of hydrogen and hydrogen d

131、erivatives affect the potential hazards. Secondly, it is by far most effective (in terms of both safety and cost) if appropriate risk-reduction measures are added early in the design stage. In many instances, if addressed early, these measures can be incorporated at little (and at times no) extra co

132、st and can result in designs that are inherently safer. Finally, the design intent needs to be maintained through the full life cycle: safety measures should not degrade.Achieving all this requires an understanding of the key properties of hydrogen (and its derivatives) that affect the hazards. As h

133、ydrogen is very different to its deriva-tives, we need to consider those separately.Hydrogen hazards Hydrogen is a flammable non-toxic gas in ambient conditions. The effect of its properties on hazards and hazard management are probably best understood by reference to another flammable non-toxic gas

134、 that is widely accepted by society: natural gas (or its primary component, methane).So how do the properties of hydrogen change the potential hazards? For hydrogen, as with natural gas, ignition of accidental releases can result in fires and explosions. Research is very active in these areas and DN

135、V is engaged in large-scale experimental research at our Research & Testing site at Spadeadam, Cumbria, UK5. Although our understanding is still developing, we know enough to understand where to concentrate efforts with hydrogen. Table 1.1 summarizes the differ-ences between hydrogen and natural gas

136、/methane, in both gaseous and liquid form. Ignition of a flammable gas cloud does not always result in an explosion. Pressure is generated when either the gas cloud is confined within an enclosure, or the flame accelerates to high speed (or both). This could occur in a wide range of possible scenari

137、os, from low-pressure leaks in domestic properties, medium-pressure leaks in hydrogen production facilities or marine applications, to high-pressure leaks from storage facilities. The severity of an explosion will depend on many factors, but in general, the more reactive the fuel the worse the explo

138、sion. Reactivity in this sense relates to how fast a flame moves through a flammable cloud. At its worst, hydrogen flames can burn about an order of magnitude faster than natural gas and much faster than most commonly-used hydrocarbons. To add to this, when a flame travels very fast, going supersoni

139、c, the explosion can transition to a detonation. A detonation is a self-sustaining explosion process with a leading shock of 20 bar that compresses the gas to a point of autoignition. The subsequent combustion provides the energy to maintain the shockwave. Our previous experience of hydrogen safety

140、is an imperfect guide, at best, as to what might happen in the future. 22DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 DNVs HyStreet Facility sits at the end of the most complete onshore beach to burner demonstration of hydrogen use anywhere in the world. DNVs HyStreet provides the domestic end-use with 100% hydrog

141、en boilers providing heating, Northern Gas Networks H21 project demonstrates distribution in the below 7 barg regime and National Grids currently- under-construction FutureGrid facility will demonstrate transmission in large diameter, high pressure systems (up to 70 barg).23Methane moleculeHydrogen

142、moleculeTABLE 1.1Comparison of hydrogen and natural gas/methane properties and hazardous outcomeHydrogen propertyGaseous (compressed) hydrogenDensityRelease rateBeing one eighth of the density of methane, in equivalent conditions the volumetric flow rate of hydrogen is 2.8 times that of methane; con

143、versely, the mass flow of methane is 2.8 times that of hydrogen. Isolated hydrogen pressure systems will depressurise faster than for methane, but larger flammable clouds may result. The higher energy density per unit mass of hydrogen means the energy flow (like for like) is similar.Dispersion and g

144、as build-upHydrogen is more buoyant than methane and will have a strong tendency to move upwards, an aspect that can be used to minimise the potential for hazardous concentra-tions to develop.IgnitabilityIgnition energyThe minimum spark energy required to ignite a hydrogen-air mixture is less than a

145、 tenth of that required for methane or natural gas. However, this does not necessarily significantly increase the chance of ignition. Testing by DNV has shown that many potential ignition sources either ignite both hydrogen and natural gas mixtures or neither. Only a small proportion will ignite hyd

146、rogen but not natural gas. Additionally, equipment approved for use in hydrogen systems is readily available.FlammabilityConcentrations of hydrogen in air between 4% and 75% are flammable, which is a much wider range than for natural gas (5-15%). This will increase the likelihood of ignition.Combust

147、ionFireReleased compressed hydrogen gas will burn as a jet fire. Flame lengths correlate well the energy flow rate and as this is similar for hydrogen and methane, in like for like conditions, the jet fire hazards are similar.ExplosionThe explosion potential for hydrogen is much greater compared to

148、methane as at higher concentrations in air (20%) the speed of the flame is much more than for methane. In addition, hydrogen-air mixtures can undergo transition to detonation in realistic conditions, which would not occur with methane.Liquid hydrogen (additional to compressed gas hazards)Temperature

149、LiquefactionIn many ways, liquid hydrogen is a cryogenic liquid like liquefied natural gas (LNG). But due to the lower temperature, spillages can liquefy and solidify air from the atmosphere. The resulting mix of liquid hydrogen and liquid/solid air has exploded in small scale field experiments. Thi

150、s does not occur with LNG.DensityBuoyancy and dispersionAs liquid hydrogen vapourizes and mixes with air, it cools the air, increasing its density. Consequently, a hydrogen air cloud produced from a liquid hydrogen release will not be as strongly buoyant as in a gaseous hydrogen case. This also occu

151、rs with LNG but in this case the LNG-air mixture will be denser than air.Introduction 124DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 Detonability varies from fuel to fuel and detonations would not occur in any realistic situation with natural gas but are entirely credible for hydrogen. It is also notable that cur

152、rent explosion simulation methods used by industry are not able to model the transition to detonation, but only indicate when it might occur, though there is still considerable uncertainty in this area.This sounds like bad news for hydrogen facilities yet we know that these properties depend on the

153、concentration of the fuel in air. If concentrations are kept below about 15% hydrogen in air, it is no worse than methane at similar concentrations. The implication is that a key element of managing hydrogen safety is the control of gas dispersion and build-up to prevent the concentration of hydroge

154、n in air exceeding 15% as far as is practicable. This is a particular challenge where dispersal space is constrained for example onboard ships. Gas detection and rapid isolation of hydrogen inventories will be key measures. Consideration of ventilation rates and ventilation patterns is also critical

155、. Importantly, current simulation methods can model gas dispersion and build-up with reasonable confidence.In summary, although hydrogens high explosion reactivity is justifiably concerning, by being aware of this issue and designing to avoid high hydrogen concen- trations in the atmosphere, it is r

156、easonable to expect we can engineer facilities that are as safe or better than widely-accepted natural gas facilities. If based on a sound technical understanding and addressed in early design, the cost implications of such engineering solutions may not be significant. Hydrogen derivatives Arguably,

157、 the most important hydrogen derivative in relation to hazard management is ammonia. Ammonia is flammable but it is relatively difficult to ignite and as its burning velocity is well below that of methane, the explosion risk is small. The key hazard with ammonia is its toxicity; it is harmful to per

158、sonnel at concentrations well below its lower flammability limit of 15% in air. For example, UK HSE indicates a concentration of 0.36% could cause 1% fatalities given 30 minutes of exposure. Concentrations of 5.5% could cause 50% fatalities following 5 minutes of exposure.While ammonia has been wide

159、ly manufactured for over 100 years and is used in considerable amounts in the manufacture of fertilizers, its potential hazards need now to be understood in the context of new energy transition applications, as is the case with hydrogen. A very relevant example is the likely use of ammonia as a fuel

160、 in the maritime sector. An ammonia release within the hull of a ship has the potential to develop potentially fatal concentrations in confined spaces. Unlike hydrogen, this hazard cannot be reduced by measures that reduce the chance of ignition; ammonia has a direct effect if released and comes int

161、o contact with personnel. There is therefore no guarantee that the risks are lower than for hydrogen, even though it has no real explosion potential. Risk assessment would involve application of standard hazard management methods and would need to consider aspects such as the types of release that c

162、ould occur, the potential concentrations that could be generated, and the likelihood of personnel being exposed to harmful levels. Mitigation methods would include ammonia release detection and emergency shutdown of ammonia systems and ventilation, but could also require the availability of emergenc

163、y breather units and very well defined escape routes.Feasibility of ammonia for shipping has been described in the DNV white paper from 2020: Ammonia as a marine fuel. The additional DNV class notation “Gas fueled ammonia” was released in July 2021.25Introduction 1Liquid organic hydrogen carriers (L

164、OHCs) have the lowest safety risks as their properties are close to those of liquid hydrocarbons already handled in large quantities. Safety management should be straightforward, though it should be noted that hydrogen will be required during production and will be produced at the point of utilizati

165、on (as may also be the case for ammonia).A key element of managing hydrogen safety is the control of gas dispersion and build-up to prevent the concentration of hydrogen in air exceeding 15% as far as is practicable. 26DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 1.5 Hydrogen investments risks There is currently u

166、nprecedented interest in renewable and low-carbon hydrogen as an energy carrier, fuel, and clean molecule. However, there is still a long way to go: first for investment to flow beyond research and pilot projects, and second to realize many large-scale hydrogen projects and develop or retrofit infra

167、structure. Huge investments required for large-scale value chains for energy purposes In 2021, USD 12bn was invested globally in hydrogen as energy carrier. Annual investment in hydrogen and its derivatives by 2030 will stand at USD 129bn and by 2050 at USD 440bn with hydrogen as an energy carrier g

168、rowing rapidly by then and well into the second half of this century. As impressive as these figures are, much more investment will be needed in hydrogen, and sooner, to ensure a Paris-compliant energy transition. Our Pathway to Net Zero Emissions sees hydrogen accounting for around 13% of global en

169、ergy demand, more than double the most likely future we forecast for hydrogen.The question arises whether a faster, bigger future for hydrogen is affordable. Within the context of world NAM North AmericaLAM Latin AmericaEUR Europe SSA Sub-Saharan AfricaMEA Middle East and North AfricaNEE North East

170、EurasiaCHN Greater China IND Indian SubcontinentSEA South East AsiaOPA OECD Pacific27Introduction 1expenditure on energy, the answer is yes. We forecast that the percentage of world gross domestic product (GDP) that will be spent on energy is set to fall from 3.2% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2050 owing to ri

171、sing efficiencies associated mainly with electrification. If the current fraction of GDP devoted to energy expenditures were to remain constant, the surplus funds to spend on clean energy would grow by around USD 2trn each year, reaching close to USD 63trn by 2050 enough to finance a transition comp

172、liant with the Paris Agreement, including the required scaling of decarbonized hydrogen.Hydrogen investment intrinsically linked to wider energy investment trends As the energy transition accelerates, energy companies are making critical, long-term strategic decisions on their futures, with much of

173、the industry making transfor-mational green investments. Financiers, meanwhile, are reassessing and bringing forward the future risk in fossil fuels fearing stranded assets, and driven by develop-ments in areas such as ESG, taxonomies, carbon pricing, and pressure from shareholders and the public. S

174、ignificant capital is looking for a new home in the energy transition, but it is not necessarily the case that this capital will flow into hydrogen. Oil and gas projects have been struggling to secure financing, with 38% of senior oil and gas professionals saying that their organi-zation is finding

175、it difficult to access reasonably priced finance for oil and gas projects6. This response is based on DNVs January 2022 survey undertaken before Russias invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, our research shows that the drivers away from fossil fuels decarbonization and the energy transition are resilie

176、nt, long-term trends that have been largely unaffected by the cyclical nature of the industry. In contrast, renewable energy projects, at least in developed markets, are receiving significant interest and there is abundant capital available to these projects the bottleneck for renewables is instead

177、permitting and available projects7. However, financing is not as readily available for projects employing technologies with less-mature value chains. For hydrogen, while interest and investment expectations are increasing, the capital is not flowing as readily into projects as it is into renewables.

178、 Reducing risk and increasing the appeal of hydrogen investments Capital will only flow into projects that are bankable. Energy companies and investors need to ensure hydrogen projects offer a balance between risk and return. This requires long-term stability, certainty, and line-of-sight, which can

179、 be strengthened by business models and long-term agreements, the regulatory environment, government support, partnerships, and technological innovation. The markets maturity is also essential, with investment risk reduced by greater certainty of demand, now and in the future. An ever-present worry

180、for companies investing in hydrogen production is where the demand will come from, at what level, and crucially, when. The core issue is that from a financing perspective, hydrogen opportunities are currently long-term, low- return, and seemingly high-risk. Financiers are unlikely to accept such ris

181、k without significant government support in terms of creating certainty and providing more direct support through subsidies and this is what we see in the markets. In the early stages of rolling out technologies, the costs are often high, and enterprises have to follow long-term strategies and imple

182、ment plans that may lack profits in the short term. But they do so to gain market share in the industry, in the expectation that once hydrogen supply and demand increase, costs will fall, and profits will improve. Early-stage investment can be a challenge. Initial support and industry involvement is

183、 needed to fast-track projects to the stage where they have lower risk and fit the profile for widely-used financial mechanisms. It is a question of achieving safe, large-scale production of low-carbon hydrogen at a lower price. The ambition is to develop the maturity of markets and investors within

184、 them, so that different financiers have the business models and risk appetites to come in at each stage of a project, from concept to completion. For hydrogen, most projects beyond pilots and R&D are in the pre-development phase. Risk is high at this stage, and it is developers and IOCs (internatio

185、nal oil companies) that are active.28DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 Certainty of demand and supply Greater certainty on the demand for technologies and innovations can reduce risk and increase investment. But as debates continue on blue vs green hydrogen, hydrogen vs electrification, and green hydrog

186、en vs batteries for energy storage, demand for hydrogen is far from certain. This report, providing DNVs independent forecast of hydrogen supply and demand to 2050, may help by providing a best estimate for a likely energy future that companies and governments may consider when forming their hydroge

187、n strategies. Beyond that, there are other ways to ensure certainty of demand, such as agreements between producers and consumers, whether in the form of a green hydrogen power purchase agreements (PPAs) or joint investment in industrial clusters for hydrogen. Announcements from major companies, suc

188、h as a switch to hydrogen by a major industrial user in steel production, or for ammonia use in shipping, can help to create certainty. Govern-ments can also lead the way as major investors and consumers of hydrogen, for example by building early demand for hydrogen use in public transport. Another

189、option for governments is to introduce quantity-based policies to stimulate the demand-side (see discussion in Chapter 2). National hydrogen strategies and policies will play a crucial role. Policymakers will need to plan at the level of energy systems, simultaneously pursuing policies to enable sig

190、nificant scaling of renewable power generation and the build out of CCS value chains. Currently, from the supply side, hydrogen producers face uncertainty in Pre-developmentDevelopmentConstructionCommencement of operation Commencement of operation +13 yearsOperational phaseDecommissioning or extensi

191、on of lifeStages of InvestmentInvestment riskDevelopersIOCsVenture CapitalRenewable FundsInfrastructure FundsPension FundsSovereign Wealth FundsDevelopment banksCommercial BanksDebt FundsDebt Capital MarketFIGURE 1.6Investor appetiteSource: Financing the Energy Transition, DNV 202129Introduction 1th

192、e supply of resources to produce low-carbon hydrogen, whether its available and affordable natural gas with sufficiently low supply-chain emissions for low-carbon blue hydrogen production, or grid surplus or dedicated renewable energy (or potential) for green hydrogen production. Further along the v

193、alue chain, consumers in hard-to-abate industries reliant on fossil fuels for fuel and feedstock are looking for solutions such as hydrogen and derivatives to decarbonize but need certainty that they will be able to access a secure and affordable supply of the low carbon alternative to which they tr

194、ansition.Standards, taxonomy and carbon price Standards and taxonomies classify activities that are sustainable and aligned with climate targets, and those which are not, providing clear direction for energy investment and the basis for incentives, standards, and regulations. Taxonomies, such as the

195、 EU taxonomy, can help to ensure capital flows into clean energy projects and technologies, and away from unabated or emissions- intense fossil fuels. Such taxonomies and standards, and certification that hydrogen projects and products comply with them, can significantly de-risk investment. The flip

196、 side is that before taxonomies are agreed and finalized, there is uncertainty and risk. Companies are unlikely to invest in blue hydrogen for example, until there is clarity on whether this will be eligible for “low-carbon” investment. DNVs research Blue Hydrogen in a Low-Carbon Energy Future (2021

197、) addresses the issue of whether blue hydrogen can be considered low carbon8. We find that blue hydrogen can be delivered with a lower greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint than the thresholds in the taxonomy as defined by the EU and World Business Council for Sustainable Development. However, this require

198、s a combination of hydrogen production technology and carbon capture that focuses on high conversion rates and high CO2 capture rates, resulting in low process-related CO2 and methane emissions. In addition, the natural gas supply-chain emissions of CO2 and methane must be kept low. Our data show th

199、at this can be delivered with current natural gas supply in some regions, but far from all. Certification of hydrogen could play a major role in this regard, directing capital to low-carbon projects, and giving both producers and consumers the confidence and data that a switch to hydrogen will suppo

200、rt their decarbonization efforts.An effective carbon price or clarity on when such a price will be implemented would also incentivize clean energy and disincentivize unabated fossil fuels. By effective, we mean properly pricing the damage caused by emissions, but also pricing at a level that makes l

201、ow-carbon technologies commercially viable. Such a carbon price would significantly de-risk hydrogen investment.Financial instruments To de-risk and improve the profitability of clean-energy opportunities governments and markets worldwide have developed business models and financial instru-ments. Th

202、ese mainly reduce risk and create certainty (such as hydrogen power purchase agreements or contracts for difference) or subsidise and incentivize (such as via feed-in-tariffs or tax equity financing) in order to develop projects and technologies to a stage where more traditional forms of financing a

203、re available such as debt and equity financing. As mentioned, hydrogen has a unique mix of attributes that give it similarities to electricity and to a fossil fuel. The question then from a finance perspective is: how will hydrogen be priced once the market matures? The view from the industry is spl

204、it roughly 50/50 on this question9. How hydrogen is priced has implications for what types of financial mechanisms would be best to employ. Electricity prices are often governed by regulatory bodies, which serve to protect consumers and guarantee a stable rate of return for providers. Fossil-fuel pr

205、ices are more driven by free-market forces, which makes them more volatile, yet potentially more profitable. More specific policies and mechanisms will need to be adapted for regions, countries, and sectors to be effective. It is visibility of the implementation, of what regulations and support for

206、these technologies will look like, that will give the certainty required. We explore hydrogen policies and strategies in more detail in Chapter 2.30DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 2 HYDROGEN POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 2.1 Policy and the hydrogen transition Hydrogens role in the energy transition has beco

207、me clearer in recent years, and more urgent just in recent months. The decarbonization pathways of a select few sectors largely rely on hydrogens environmental credentials, while ensuring affordability, availability, and safety. Renewable and low-carbon hydrogen will increasingly play a part as stra

208、tegic energy carriers for an energy-secure future. However, realizing any innovation journey depends on regulatory frameworks prompting stakeholder coope- ration and aligning decisions and collective competencies. There is a need to co-evolve the hydrogen value chains and ecosystems from production,

209、 distribution, and use. At the same time, policy must unleash additional renewable power capacities and CCS deployment, as both are prerequisites for renewable (green) and low-carbon (blue) hydrogen, e-fuels and hydrogen carriers. Here we delve into policy and regulations that are already in play to

210、 accelerate the evolution. In Section 2.4, we describe the policy considerations directly factored into our forecast. We also summarize key considerations for policymakers (see opposite).Revamping regulatory frameworks to advance hydrogen energy The hydrogen innovation trajectory, and overcoming its

211、 barriers, are shaped by the emerging and harmonizing regulatory frameworks, displaying a broad spectrum from government policy to industry regulation that incentivize coordination through codes of practice and standards. For any nascent energy carrier and market, a comprehensive regulatory framewor

212、k needs development, and hydrogen is no different. Policymakers and regulators face added complexity from the fragmented set of players and different energy subsectors, traditionally operating and regulated within their own silos. With more sector coupling, these players and sectors are increasingly

213、 intertwined, requiring harmonized regulatory frameworks that view electricity and gas sectors cohesively. Regulatory frameworks will have to address several hydrogen production and use areas simultaneously, such as: Decarbonizing existing hydrogen production and use Fuel switching (e.g. from natura

214、l gas to hydrogen), which means retrofitting or modifying infrastructure mostly in established industry New uses, which means establishing new infrastructure for conversion of energy carriers (e.g. from diesel trucks to hydrogen electric fuel cell versions) that are largely outside the fence of indu

215、stry-regulated areas.31Key considerations for policymakers1. Policies must target multiple sectors as renewable/low-carbon hydrogen can be a sustainable energy carrier, fuel, and chemical feedstock. Hydrogen can assist decarbonization where electrification is difficult and will be used in making sus

216、tainable end products (e.g., ammonia/fertilizers), green materials (e.g., steel and aluminium), and low-carbon chemicals (e.g., methanol and plastics).2. Decarbonization policies/regulation must address safety gaps. There are gaps in guidelines and operational procedures for hydrogen, especially lar

217、ge-scale production, storage, transport, and new end-uses. For a safe transition, new/retrofitted infrastructure will need updated guidelines and standards alongside policies and regulation.3. Regulation is complex but can be tailored to required transitions. Regulation is needed for decarbonizing c

218、urrent hydrogen production/use; retrofitting or modifying infrastructure for fuel switching; new uses; and production with new infrastructure. Existing, updated, and new policies can be overarching or sector-specific.4. Policies/regulation must spur ramp-up of technologies to support hydrogen use. P

219、olicies must unleash renewable/ low-carbon hydrogen production by vastly boosting renewable power capacity, CCS, new/retrofitted gas and power grids, and scale production of electrolysers. CCS is also needed at huge scale for direct air capture of CO2 to meet climate targets.5. Hydrogen needs polici

220、es that accelerate production and offtake. Direct funding is the main tool supporting scaling of low-carbon hydrogen production by lowering CAPEX costs. Demand-side policy must stimulate offtake. Fiscal policies (e.g. carbon pricing, taxes reflecting carbon efficiency/pollutants) are needed for low-

221、carbon hydrogen to compete with unabated fossil-based hydrogen. Market-based instruments such as contracts for difference (CfDs) can cut OPEX costs and offer predictable terms for producers and end users.6. Decarbonized hydrogen can benefit humanity but needs infrastructure plans and investment. Hyd

222、rogen can be part of existing gas systems, or a decarbonized energy carrier for medium- to long-term storage, providing energy security. As a feedstock for ammonia/fertilizers, it supports food security. Maximizing these benefits hinges on planning and new public infrastructure investments (e.g. sal

223、t caverns to store hydrogen, and new/retrofitted gas pipelines to transport it), and on continued use of existing practices and infrastructure for ammonia while decarbonizing its production.7. Easy wins include decarbonizing existing hydrogen production and use. Use renewable hydrogen from electroly

224、sers co-located with industries and capture carbon from fossil-based hydrogen production. This requires support to reduce investment costs and incentivize early retirement of fossil-based capacity in a policy package to increase competitiveness of low carbon-intensity hydrogen. 8. A comprehensive re

225、gulatory toolbox is needed to encourage fuel switching, retrofitted/newbuild infrastructure, and multiple decarbonization options. Hard-to-abate industries need more support for retrofitting/replacing equipment and/or modifying infrastructure. New infrastructure must often be built alongside existin

226、g assets before old infrastructure is retrofitted. Higher OPEX and lower margins are seldom options for commodity producers, unless markets offer green premiums. Sectors will often choose hybrid decarbonization pathways (electrification, hydrogen, CCS) requiring a policy mix. Regulation of integrate

227、d energy systems is key if harmonization between sectors and across borders is needed.9. New production and offtake require new regulatory frameworks, standards, and guidelines. This is relevant, for example, for offshore hydrogen production, new direct hydrogen offtake, or hydrogen carrier use in s

228、hipping or aviation. Innovation and full-scale testing and developments are needed. Moving beyond pilots to large-scale testing and implementation often requires new regulations, standards, and guidelines.10. Readiness for scaling is high, but key factors block investment. Policy should aim to remov

229、e barriers to large-scale investments. Key barriers include: having no framework for guaranteeing the origin/traceability of hydrogen; renewable power and CCS capacity must scale while reducing CAPEX/OPEX costs; support mechanisms (e.g. CfDs or higher carbon pricing on fossil hydrogen) are crucial f

230、or low-carbon hydrogen. Hydrogen policies and strategies 232DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 Governments are steering the trajectory by incorporating hydrogen into planning and requirements. Their targets and dedicated hydrogen budgets aim to catalyse projects and advance scaling timeously and safely t

231、owards 2030 and 2050 climate objectives. Synchronously, government strategies and policies are geared towards industrial positioning, competitive advantages and, increasingly, towards energy security. However, our analysis of regions (highlights presented in Section 2.3) shows that not all regions a

232、nd governments are stimulating hydrogen development comprehensively across the full chain from production to use. Policy measures amongst pioneer countries kick-start technology cost-learning dynamics. We saw this with solar and wind power cost reductions in their early-stage development. The same w

233、ill be the case for specific hydrogen technologies. Front-runner countries play a big role in kick-starting learning and cost reductions. For example, Germany is speeding up its hydrogen transition, with EUR 7bn made available to drive the market rollout towards 2030, while the US is dedicating USD

234、8bn to hydrogen hubs and aims for clean hydrogen produced at USD 1 per kilogram of hydrogen (/kgH2) within the decade.Businesses are the key agents in all development phases from demonstration and deployment to hydrogen infrastructure and transportation. Some hydrogen technologies are well-establish

235、ed (e.g. grey hydrogen used directly in refineries and ammonia production), while others are not (e.g. infrastructure for new end use, large-scale electrolysers and offshore production). An industrialized or commercialized scale-up with safe and cost-effective production, transportation, and use of

236、hydrogen needs carefully crafted policy frameworks to succeed. Towards this end, policymakers are shaping the business innovation agenda as seen recently in the government-led Glasgow Breakthroughs, the global Mission Innovation initiative, and the public-private partnership First Movers Coalition.I

237、nternational collaboration is pulling government and industry players together to progress hydrogen. This is exemplified by the Partnership Agreement between the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the Hydrogen Council; the IRENA and World Economic Forum (WEF) Hydrogen Toolbox; and the

238、 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) SMI hydrogen industry pledges initiative (H2Zero), also with proposed policies1. These collaborative initiatives are instrumental in facilitating harmonization and exchange of best practices. 4. Safety and hazardsAcceptance criteria and doc

239、umentation varying from country to countryHydrogen barriers that policies must overcome1. Costs and financial supportNo carbon cost internalization and limited support to first phase scaling and commercialization 2. Demand and competition Competition between 1) low-carbon blue and renewable green hy

240、drogen 2) electrification, and 3) fossil alternatives 5. Infrastructure and indirect enablersRenewable power production with robust grids onshore and offshore, and CCS value chains6. Standards and certificationNo GoO certification with traceability and LCA frameworks, standards for large-scale safe

241、design needs updating3. Technology and manufacturingLimited manufacturing for green and blue H2 technologies, and offshore PtX needs maturingFIGURE 2.1Breakdown of barriers for policies to overcome33Hydrogen policies and strategies 22.1.1 What policies and regulatory frameworks must target to overco

242、me barriers Regulatory frameworks and policies need tailoring to overcome administrative, technical, and economic barriers to hydrogen scale-up, and with safety as a cross-cutting priority. Figure 2.1 is inspired by the work of IRENA & WEF 20222 and recaps the current state of play. These potential

243、showstoppers need to be overcome to facilitate a safe and accelerated scaling of hydrogen production, enabling infrastructure, and supporting new offtake. The figure shows the main barrier categories the policies must address. This is not an exhaustive checklist. While some barriers are overarching,

244、 global and regional, most must be dealt with on a country-by- country basis.1. Costs and financial support No carbon cost internalization Lack of upstream support Lack of downstream support Unfit market design Unclear frameworks for Contracts for Differences until fossil hydrogen, and alternatives

245、become more costly A higher cost level for the future ( 1.52 EUR/kg), not possible for any kind of hydrogen (except turquoise/ pyrolysis and purple/nuclear?)4. Safety and hazards Acceptance criteria and documentation, varying from country to country, some do not have established criteria No experien

246、ce with large-scale green hydrogen production ( 200 MW), and unclear safety philosophies and inherently safe design Little experience with hydrogen use for certain sectors (fuel switching and new use) Unclear national and local procedures for approving new installations, especially outside industry

247、areas2. Demand and competition Global competitiveness between H2 production and trade Global competition between alternatives to hydrogen use (batteries, electrification and existing fossil alternatives) Availability and security of supply (where storage is minimized due to high costs)6. Standards a

248、nd certification No Guarantee of Origin (GoO) certification of hydrogen No GoO certification of hydrogen derivatives Incompatibility across borders Unclear methodology for estimates in lifecycle assessment (LCA) of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions Lack of clarity on environmental impact beyond GHGs St

249、andardization for design and safety5. Infrastructure and indirect enablers Slow renewable capacity deployment and unclear additionality Carbon capture and storage (CCS) value chains Power grid capacity power grid for distributed green hydrogen production Gas grid retrofit or newbuild for buffering/s

250、torage of early production, connecting large-scale production (in new areas) and offtake (in existing clusters) Lack of infrastructure support and development Infrastructure uncertainty3. Technology and manufacturing Materials use in equipment De-risking new industrial applications Electrolyser and

251、fuel cells performance Assessing compatibility of the existing gas grid De-risking integrated Power-to-X (PtX) pathways Slow electrolyser manufacturing expansion Fuel cell manufacturing capacity Industrial assets lifetime delaying renewal34DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 2.2 Details on the policy and

252、regulatory landscape Several hydrogen-related guides for policy makers have been published recently (e.g., IEA 2021, IRENA 20213). To progress the hydrogen transition, there is a policy toolbox of known and proven measures available (e.g. DNV Energy Transition Outlook 2021, Section 6.54), which lean

253、s heavily on approaches and experience from advancing renewable electricity over decades. However, new policy measures tailored to specific needs along the value chain are needed and are evolving. In this section, we elaborate five policy categories that affect the most likely hydrogen future to 205

254、0. Four of them are national strategies, technology-push, demand-pull, and fiscal policies. A fifth, standards and certification, gets its main impetus from public and private partnerships. National strategies with timelines and targets are the first step to creating a stable planning horizon and ce

255、rtainty for stakeholders. The second step is to establish more costly fossil-energy carriers (see elaboration under fiscal policies page 34) until the hydrogen value-chain becomes economically viable.National hydrogen strategies and roadmaps have been multiplying in DNVs Energy Transition Outlook (E

256、TO) regions. Not surprisingly, this is predominantly in regions with net-zero mid-century ambitions, such as Europe, North America, and OECD Pacific. However, we see great variation in terms of comprehensiveness and real policies on how to deliver under these strategies.As part of green hydrogen str

257、ategies, renewable electric-ity development needs significant attention and upscaling, where additionality meaning renewable-based electricity consumed by electrolysers is additional to renewables meeting renewable electricity consumption targets is also expected to be a requirement. The buildout al

258、so needs a speedier process. A data insight from Energymonitor.ai (2022 based on GlobalData5) showed that Top 20 EU countries have four-times more wind capacity in permitting than under construction, and that the standstill is not a uniquely European challenge: while 81% of the EUs wind pipeline is

259、stuck in permitting, the US (79%), China (74%), and India (64%) are also facing logjams. Renewable power buildout is a prerequisite for green hydrogen production, and the scale required is enormous: DNVs Pathway to Net Zero study (20216) projects electricity demand growth of more than 180% by 2050,

260、with the largest (400-fold) increase in power demand coming from hydrogen production via electrolysis. 35Hydrogen policies and strategies 2Real policy and support measures are needed to catalyse implementation of national hydrogen strategies. Technology-push policies are at play to advance technolog

261、ies along the entrepreneurial and technology development cycle from R&D and piloting to scale-up.We find that government funding programmes with investment grants/loans to capital expenditures (CAPEX) are the dominant early-stage form of support. Programmes are focusing on promoting renewable and lo

262、w-carbon hydrogen production. Funding is available to decarbonize existing hydrogen production, new merchant production, and for transformation projects for switching to hydrogen-based fuels (i.e., e-fuels, ammonia). In Figure 2.2, the average annual government funding (targeted for hydrogen, and no

263、n-targeted but for which hydrogen projects qualify) available for different regions is mapped against national production targets in 2030. Some regions e.g. Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and OECD Pacific show a clear connection between ambitions on scaling hydrogen production and available f

264、unding. In addition to local production, Europe has targets of 10 Mt/yr renewable hydrogen imports. Other regions have ambitious targets but are lacking in funding, which is likely to make it more difficult to reach their targets. However, with several of these regions (e.g. Latin America and Sub-Sa

265、haran Africa) mainly targeting production for exports, funding might be available from international partnerships with importing regions. As an example, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is promoting green hydrogen production in South Africa (see Section 2.3.4

266、).To date, only a few countries have production support mechanisms supporting operational expenditures (OPEX) over a fixed timeframe. One example is the US, where a 10-year tax credit per kilogram of hydrogen (see Section 2.3.1), is proposed with tax-credit rates tailored to emissions, the highest t

267、o renewable hydrogen. Another example is Denmarks planned feed-in tariff scheme with a fixed-price subsidy, also for 10 years. We expect to see more schemes supporting OPEX costs and a guaranteed price to producers in the future to enhance the business case for both producers and users. In this rega

268、rd, Contracts for Difference (CfDs) are a plausible mechanism. As CAPEX support is likely to dwindle over time after initial government-supported plants have been built and grey hydrogen remains less expensive because of, for example, insufficient carbon pricing a long-term arrangement is needed to

269、close the economic gap and incentivize continued investments. CfDs support operational costs with a strike price guaran-teed to producers over a fixed period. Such contracts can provide stable and predictable terms for producers, and for end users because, through continued investments and reduction

270、 in hydrogen costs, they have spillover effects for hydrogen price and demand in end uses.Demand-pull policies are in play to create demand for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen in new applications as well as among established industry to switch from unabated fossil-based hydrogen. We find that gove

271、rnment funding programmes are equally available to hydrogen consumers to cover CAPEX such as that linked to conversion of process technology and equipment upgrades (e.g. to use hydrogen for heating in manufacturing, buildings, and heavy transport).It is uncommon to find quota-based or quantity-based

272、 policies to stimulate consumption and create demand among end-use sectors. Future policy packages are likely to involve mechanisms such as binding targets and obligations on demand sectors (e.g. industrial consumers requiring a fixed amount/share of energy/fuels to come from hydrogen). The EU is pr

273、oposing to mandate green hydrogen in the EU energy mix by 2030 (e.g. with a transport sector sub-target of 2.6% from green hydrogen and e-fuels) with use of RFNBOs (renewable fuels of non-biological origin) to meet targets. In road transport, California as part of the North America region, South Kor

274、ea, Japan and China have targets and support for fuel-cell powered vehicles (FCEVs) and infrastructure development.We expect to see hydrogen blend mandates applied in maritime and aviation to trigger uptake in the future. Grid blending of a certain percentage into the gas grid is 36DNV Hydrogen fore

275、cast to 2050 another option that could provide long-term volume offtake certainty and confidence to new investments. Overall, we find that policy measures to spark offtake and demand creation across end-use segments are rather limited.Fiscal policies include economy-wide economic signals, such as ca

276、rbon pricing to pass on carbon costs to emitters, hence encouraging the use of low-carbon or renewable hydrogen. Although the number of schemes is increasing, carbon pricing is not at sufficient levels across ETO regions. In combination with fossil-fuel subsidies, this limits decar-bonization, CCS u

277、ptake, and hydrogen competitiveness overall. Robust carbon prices stimulate innovation and are needed to close the cost gap between conventional unabated fossil-fuel-based technologies and new hydrogen-based technologies. Operating alongside carbon pricing are energy taxation, and often high grid-co

278、nnection costs and taxes on grid-connected power consumption. Reform efforts are expected, as exemplified by the revision of the EU Energy Taxation Directive, for increasing alignment of taxation with environmental performance and climate objectives. Reforms will unfold at an uneven pace with high-i

279、ncome regions (with net-zero targets by 2050) being first movers in the refinement of tax schemes to promote electrification and hydrogen use. Implementing safety standards and certification schemes are key in scaling hydrogen as an energy carrier and fostering international trade.To pave the way fo

280、r global trade of hydrogen and other hydrogen-derivatives (see Chapter 6), standards and certifications need to be in place as they ensure clarity on the quality and origin of a product. A key aspect here is establishing the carbon intensity of the hydrogen produced, to guarantee that it really is c

281、ontributing to meeting decarbonization targets.Although these standards and guidelines need further development, we see several promising initiatives from both industry and public-private partnerships. Some examples are the Hydrogen Production Analysis Task Force (IPHE) on GHG estimation methodology

282、, and the WBCSD initiative on low-carbon hydrogen pledges from industry and supporting methodology for calculating emission levels. Other initiatives include new national and EU legislation on certification of hydrogen, such as enabled by the voluntary CertifHyTM certification scheme providing guara

283、ntees of origin and transparent information about environmental attributes of hydrogen. These will be essential to support harmonization and, in so doing, establishing the global hydrogen value chain. In addition to product certification schemes, clarity, standardization and harmonization on the tec

284、hnical and safety aspects of hydrogen are needed to ensure secure and reliable supply. It can be a challenge to scale hydro-gen as an energy carrier at the pace required to meet decarbonization targets while also achieving satisfactory hydrogen safety. Nevertheless, safety requirements need to be th

285、e foundation of all projects, as unwanted inci-dents can slow down or halt developments. Although safety guidelines and regulation for hydrogen and other carriers such as ammonia are well known in established industries, this is not the case for several new use-cases, such as for large-scale storage

286、 or hydrogen blending in pipelines. Industry is now paving the way in establishing new, global standards on hydrogen-related activities. Although several countries might have to adopt their own standards, having global and harmonized standards across regions and sectors can help de-risk hydrogen pro

287、jects and provide clarity for all parties involved.As part of green hydrogen strategies, renewable electricity development needs significant attention and upscaling.37Hydrogen policies and strategies 22.3 Regional hydrogen policy developments The field of regional policy analysis is a moving target

288、with frequent new policy announcements. Nevertheless, we have assessed the current state of play, focusing on the extent to which plans and targets are backed by comprehensive policy packages to ensure their execution. In other words, policy packages that address the hydrogen value chain from produc

289、tion to usage, and so instil a level of believability in implementation. Our analysis of the policy landscape of national strategies, targets, funding levels and policy measures suggests that not all regions have comprehensive policy frameworks in place to implement hydrogen ambitions. Some regions

290、are clearly at the forefront of advancing hydrogen. Others look less mature despite encompassing individual countries that have taken steps to position themselves as front-runners on the global hydrogen stage.Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the 10 world regions and their targeted new renewable or

291、 low-carbon hydrogen production in 2030. Note that this does not include targets on imported hydrogen. The placement of region bubbles is determined by the comprehensiveness of present policy packages in terms of their combination of technology-push, demand-pull, and fiscal policies. We have not att

292、empted to score the content of individual policies. Rather the intent is to pinpoint how regions are positioned with regards to putting in place a holistic set of policy measures to achieve their announced ambitions and to advance their hydrogen development trajectories. Europe is in the lead. The p

293、olicy package provides substantial funding to kick-start the scaling of hydrogen production and cluster development. In parallel, offtake and utilization in end-use sectors are stimulated; for example, proposed legally binding targets and obligations on fuel suppliers. Cost competitiveness against c

294、onventional fossil-fuelled technologies is advanced through tightening carbon pricing (inclusion of more sectors and removal of exemptions), and the carbon-border adjustment mechanism aims to create a level playing field between EU and non-EU suppliers.38DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 The OECD Pacifi

295、c and North America regions trail Europe. They also have strategies, targets and funding pushing the supply-side, but with lower carbon-price levels and fewer or no carbon-pricing schemes at all (some US states, Australia). Carbon pricing is not central to the US climate change programme, for exampl

296、e. The North America region also has less- concrete targets/policies, and hence less predictability, on the future end-use uptake trajectory. Greater China follows on, recently providing more clarity on funding and hydrogen prospects towards 2035 coupled with an expanding national emissions trading

297、scheme. But beyond the road transport sector, real policy frameworks are not yet concrete. Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa each include a select few countries where the hydrogen policy agenda is firmly established with strategies and funding, particularly targeting hydrogen produc

298、tion for exports. While Latin America has a key focus on renewable-based green hydrogen production, the Middle East and North Africa focus on hydrogen from renewables, nuclear, and natural gas with CCS. Indian Subcontinent, with India being the dominant economy, has an announced hydrogen mission and

299、 funding programme also emphasizing domestic industrial consumption, replacing present unabated fossil-fuel based hydrogen. However, the region has yet to establish comprehensive policy and regulatory frameworks, including on carbon pricing. North East Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa have some countr

300、y strategies and targets for becoming blue and green suppliers, respectively, with the latter depending on foreign investments. South East Asia has no policy in place yet.Key policy developments in our forecast regions are highlighted overleaf.39Hydrogen policies and strategies 22.3.1 North America

301、National strategies: Canada and the US are targeting net zero GHGs by 2050, with hydrogen use pivotal to success. The USs National Clean Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap, and the Hydrogen Energy Earthshot (June 2021), target cost reduction for clean hydrogen by 80% to USD 1/kgH2 by 2030. Canadas Hydrog

302、en Strategy (December 2020) aims for global leadership in clean supply and for a 30% share of hydrogen in end-use energy by 2050. No specific production targets are mentioned, though the Canadian strategy states a potential for 4 Mt/yr clean hydrogen production by 2030.The regions focus is on advanc

303、ing production hubs in low-carbon (blue) hydrogen and electrolysis based on renewables or nuclear. End-use plans include switching of existing grey hydrogen, industrial processes, road transport, and grid balancing. Carbon-free power sector targets (US by 2035, Canada 90% by 2030) facilitate hydroge

304、n efforts, as do strong CCS policy with R&D funding, requirements, and economic instruments (e.g. the US Section 45Q tax credit and grants).Technology-push: Several US and Canadian federal governmental funding programmes are available for CAPEX support and scale-up. For example, the US has a USD 8bn

305、 Hydrogen Hub Plan, USD 1bn for R&D, and the USD 500mn hydrogen supply-chain initiative. Canada has a federal Low-Carbon and Zero-emissions Fuels Fund of CAD 1.5bn (USD 1.1bn) including funding for hydrogen, and the CAD 2.75bn (USD 2.1bn) Zero Emission Transit Fund for vehicles and refuelling statio

306、ns. The US tax credit proposal to producers also aims to incentivize hydrogen uptake through a maximum tax credit rate of USD 3/kgH2 for 10 years for hydrogen produced with a carbon intensity below 0.45 kgCO2e/kgH2 (for projects beginning construction before 2029). The tax credit rate decreases with

307、 increasing carbon intensity; for example, production with a carbon intensity between 1.5 and 2.5 kgCO2e/kgH2 receives 25% of the full tax credit. Facilities with 46 kgCO2/kgH2 must be placed into service before 2027.Demand-pull: States and provinces have individual road-maps and policies. For examp

308、le, California is already leading hydrogen mobility/infrastructure globally because of its Zero Emission Vehicle policy and incentives. Canadian provinces are also developing programmes supporting hydrogen storage and grid-integration pilots, industry phase-in and hydrogen-ready equipment (e.g. in O

309、ntario). A regulatory framework for blending hydrogen in gas and propane systems, encouraging use in heavy transport, exists in British Columbia.Carbon pricing: We see this rising in Canada from CAD 15/tCO2 to CAD 170/tCO2 in 2030. There are US state schemes, but no federal policy. Our projection fo

310、r the regional average carbon-price level is USD 25/tCO2 in 2030 and 70/tCO2 by 2050. 2.3.2 Latin America National strategies and targets: Several countries are developing hydrogen strategies (e.g. Uruguay in 2021 and Paraguay in 2022). Chiles National Green Hydrogen Strategy (2020) and Colombias Hy

311、drogen Roadmap (2021) are the most concrete to date. Both target clean hydrogen production to become global hydrogen export hubs. Among others, Chile aims to have 5 GW of 40DNV Hydrogen forecast to 2050 electrolyser capacity under development by 2025, and 25 GW with committed funding by 2030. Colomb

312、ia aims for 13 GW electrolysis capacity installed and 50 kt/yr of blue hydrogen produced by 2030. There is no concrete CCS policy, but the region has diversified its electricity mix with high renewable shares/targets with government capacity tenders/competitive bidding.Local industry (e.g. mining, C

313、hiles largest industry) and heavy-duty transport are key focus areas for hydrogen use; for example, Colombia plans for 40% of industry hydrogen consumption to be low-carbon hydrogen by 2030. However, the principal focus is on exporting hydrogen.Technology-push: There is limited public funding for sc

314、aling hydrogen. The Chilean governments Production Development Corporation (CORFO) has funding of USD 50mn, with a cap of USD 30mn per company, to finance electrolyser investments.Demand-pull: There are limited policy frameworks in road transport; for example, vehicle tax exemptions for light EVs (l

315、ikely transferrable to FCEVs) and CAPEX support including for refuelling infrastructure, such as for public buses.Carbon pricing: There are schemes, but pricing is low. Our projection for the regional average carbon-price level is USD 25/tCO2 in 2030, and 50/tCO2 by 2050.2.3.3 Europe National strate

316、gies and targets: Europe is a front-runner in the energy transition with its Green Deal to deliver a transformation to a sustainable, low-carbon economy and a climate-neutral EU by 2050. The European Union (EU) hydrogen strategy (2020) aims for at least 40 GW electrolyser capacity installed in 2030

317、(6 GW by 2024). REPower EU (2022) boosts ambitions, aiming for 10 Mt of domestic renewable hydrogen and 10 Mt of renewable imports, by 2030. Some countries in the region (e.g. Germany) are expected to develop into large-scale importers of hydrogen, with others becoming exporters or transit hubs. Sev

318、eral countries in the region have their own strategies and targets for installed hydrogen production capacity by 2030 to support the EU goals: for example, Denmark (46 GW), France (6.5 GW), Italy (5 GW), Germany (5 GW), and Spain (4 GW).In REPowerEU, the EUs revision of the Renewable Energy Directiv

319、e proposes a 45% renewable share of European energy use by 2030, bringing renewable generation capacities to 1,236 GW compared with 1,067 GW envisaged under Fit for 55. Hence there is strong focus on scaling renewable hydrogen production in the EU, though low-carbon hydrogen is recognized in a trans

320、i-tional phase. The key focuses towards 2030 are scaling electrolyser capacity, decarbonizing existing hydrogen use in industry, promoting hydrogen for new use-cases, and buildout of distribution infrastructure including storage facilitates. Technology-push: Hydrogen projects can apply to several EU

321、 funding programmes supporting the Green Deal. The EU also recently established the public-private Clean Hydrogen Partnership to accelerate development and improvement of clean hydrogen applications. The total funding available is EUR 1bn in grants from public funding, and EUR 1bn from industry. The

322、 first call for proposals this year saw a total of EUR 600mn available for 41 topics across the hydrogen value chain. Several countries also have their own funding programmes targeted for hydrogen, most notably the German Packet for the Future with EUR 7bn for hydrogen market rollout plus EUR 2bn fo

323、r fostering international partnerships. CCS policy is an enabler of hydrogen. The EU Innovation Fund finances up to 60% of the additional investment and operational costs of large-scale projects. The focus is on Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and supporting chains to benefit several industrial i

324、nstallations for example, the Northern Lights and Porthos projects in 41Hydrogen policies and strategies 2Norway and the Netherlands, respectively. Several EU and non-EU countries (e.g. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK) have CCS policies to help achieve net-zero ambitions. Demand-pull: Alth

325、ough governmental funding is mainly based on grants as a percentage of CAPEX support (up to 50%) for hydrogen production, the funding is also available for other parts of the hydrogen value chain, stimulating demand offtake. Moreover, the European Commission is to propose Carbon Contracts for Differ

326、ence (CCfDs) for green hydrogen as part of its REPowerEU scheme. CfDs for hydrogen proposed by the UK are set to be finalized by the end of 2022.Carbon pricing: There are established schemes with clear upward pricing trends. Our projection for the regional average carbon-price level is USD 95/tCO2 i

327、n 2030 and 135/tCO2 by 2050.2.3.4 Sub-Saharan Africa National strategies and targets: Some countries within ETO regions are taking steps to becoming hydrogen exporters to Europe. South Africas Hydrogen Society Roadmap (February 2021) aims for renewable hydrogen exports, targeting a 4% global market

328、share by 2050 with the following timetabled production capacity targets:1 MW electrolyser production piloted to 2024; expansion to 10 GW (20252030); and 15 GW capacity installed (20302040). Technology-push: There are low funding levels and no dedicated support programmes for hydrogen. South Africa h

329、as a ZAR 800mn ( USD 49mn) green fund to support green initiatives including renewable energy and hydrogen. Renewable power is targeted with shares around 40% of the energy mix by 2030 (e.g. in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria). No country in the region has concrete CCS policy.Hydrogen development is li

330、kely to advance only if supported through international funding and bilateral government offtake agreements. Indication of movement in this direction is seen in Germanys energy links with the region. It is providing EUR 12.5mn to promote green hydrogen production in South Africa; intends to form a g

331、reen hydrogen partnership with Namibia, and developed the H2Atlas-Africa project with Sub-Saharan partner nations. Development finance institutions will also be primary financiers if green hydrogen projects are to advance.Demand-pull: No relevant policy frameworks are available in the region.Carbon

332、pricing: Low/absent carbon pricing and slow adoption are expected. Our projection for the regional average carbon-price level is USD 5/tCO2 in 2030 and 25/tCO2 by 2050.Note: Africa faces energy poverty and lacks stable energy supply infrastructure, hampering economic development. Making affordable p

333、ower available for Sub-Saharan Africas underserved population, and for economic development, should be prime objectives. Decarbonizing the regions power sectors should be another objective before pivoting into renewa-ble-based hydrogen for exports. Hydrogen development is likely to advance only if supported through international funding and bilateral government offtake agreements. 42DNV Hydrogen f